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Abstract Security and privacy are the key issues for
the Internet of Things (IoT) systems. Especially, secure
search is an important functionality for cooperation
among users’ devices and non-trusted servers. Public-
key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) enables us
to search encrypted data, and is expected to be used be-
tween a cloud server and users’ mobile devices or IoT
devices. However, those mobile devices might be lost
or stolen. For IoT devices, it might be difficult to store
keys in a tamper-proof manner due to prohibitive costs.
In this paper, we deal with such a key-exposure prob-
lem on PEKS, and introduce the concept of PEKS with
key-updating functionality, which we call key-updatable
PEKS (KU-PEKS). Specifically, we propose two mod-
els of KU-PEKS: the key-evolution model and the key-
insulation model. In the key-evolution model, a pair of
public and secret keys can be updated if needed (e.g.,
the secret key is exposed). In the key-insulation model,
The preliminary version of this paper was published in the
proceedings of the 23rd Australasian Conference on Informa-
tion Security and Privacy (ACISP 2018) [3]. This is the full
version.
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the public key remains fixed while the secret key can
be updated if needed. The former model makes a con-
struction simple and more efficient than the latter. On
the other hand, the latter model is preferable for prac-
tical use since a user never updates their public key. We
show constructions in each model in a black-box man-
ner. We also give implementation results on Raspberry
Pi 3, which can be regarded as a reasonable platform
of IoT devices.
Keywords Searchable encryption · Public-key
encryption with keyword search · Key updates · IoT
environments · Raspberry Pi
1 Introduction
Security and privacy are crucial for the Internet of Things
(IoT) systems; especially, making search functionality
secure is important for the cooperation among devices
and non-trusted servers. Public-key encryption with key-
word search (PEKS), proposed by Boneh et al. [7], en-
ables a user to search encrypted data with keywords in
a privacy-preserving way. PEKS is an efficient solution
to the problem of constructing a private information re-
trieval (PIR) system [13,9]; for example, PEKS can be
applied in a search system on an e-mail server. A user
encrypts keywords related to each e-mail, such as “ur-
gent”, by PEKS as well as e-mails by S/MIME. Both e-
mails and their corresponding keywords are stored in a
database connected to the server. When the user wants
to search for a keyword, they generate a trapdoor of
the keyword. The server can check whether or not each
stored e-mail contains the keyword while the server can
get only negligible information on the e-mails and the
keyword. Importantly, such a system might be imple-
mented in mobile or IoT devices which could be lost or
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stolen. Furthermore, the side-channel attack (e.g., [22])
is a class of powerful attacks that directly leak secret
information such as secret keys. Therefore, we need a
countermeasure against the leakage of those keys, how-
ever, it is unrealistic to make IoT devices tamper-proof
as it involves significant costs.
In this paper, we are interested in resolving such a
key-exposure problem on PEKS, and we consider key-
updating functionality for PEKS. In fact, according to
the NIST guideline SP800-57 [26], “re-keying”, which
we call “key update” in this paper, is one of the im-
portant factors affecting the length of a cryptoperiod.1
Therefore, it is important to investigate this key-updating
functionality for PEKS, however, to the best of our
knowledge, little research has been done on it thus far.
Abdalla et al. [2] considered public-key encryption with
temporary keyword search (PETKS), in which the server
can search ciphertexts encrypted during a cryptope-
riod by using a trapdoor generated in the same cryp-
toperiod. Namely, the trapdoor is available only during
the cryptoperiod, and therefore it reduces information
leaked to the server. However, PETKS does not have
key-updating functionality. Tang [29] proposed a PEKS
scheme secure against the key exposure problem in the
sense of forward security (not a PEKS scheme with cer-
tain key-updating functionality). The security relies on
non-standard assumptions in composite-order groups,
and therefore the resulting scheme is inefficient.
1.1 Our Contribution
In this paper, we introduce key-updatable public-key en-
cryption with keyword search (KU-PEKS), which is the
first PEKS with key-updating functionality.
The concept of KU-PEKS. First of all, we describe
the concept of KU-PEKS, and clarify its requirements.
Let us consider an e-mail service that automatically
forwards an e-mail to user’s smartphone if a keyword
specified by the user, such as “urgent”, is tagged to the
e-mail. Suppose that a secret key generated by PEKS
is stored in the smartphone, and then the user can
specify the keyword by the trapdoor generated from
the secret key and receive the corresponding e-mails
without revealing any information on the keyword. The
smartphone might be lost or stolen, and therefore the
secret key (and its corresponding information) is up-
dated periodically (or if needed). Then, taking into ac-
count practicality, the updated key should be used to
1 A cryptoperiod [26] means the time span during which a
specific key is authorized for use or in which the keys for a
given system or application may remain in effect.
search all encrypted keywords even if they were previ-
ously encrypted (i.e., encrypted in previous cryptope-
riods). On the other hand, old trapdoors (i.e., trap-
doors generated from the previous version of the secret
key) should be useless to search for new keywords. Note
that PETKS [2] and the Tang PEKS with forward se-
curity [29] do not have such functionality.
To wrap up, we consider the following three require-
ments of KU-PEKS.
Requirement 1: It is hard to guess an updated secret
key from old (exposed) keys and public information
(including the public key).
Requirement 2: Trapdoors generated from a new se-
cret key can be used to search ciphertexts even if
they were previously encrypted and old secret keys
are already deleted. This requirement is for the pur-
pose of availability.
Requirement 3: Trapdoors generated from a secret
key are useless to search for keywords encrypted af-
ter the secret key is updated.
Our proposal. Based on the above requirements, we
propose two models of KU-PEKS: a key-evolution model
(Section 3) and a key-insulation model (Section 4). The
former model is one of the most likely models of KU-
PEKS, and the latter model is based on key-insulated
cryptography introduced by Dodis et al. [15].
In the key-evolution model, a pair of public and se-
cret keys can be updated if the secret key is exposed.
This model makes a construction simple and efficient
while not only the secret key but the public key have to
be updated. Actually, we construct a KU-PEKS scheme
in this model from any collision resistant hash func-
tion, any public-key encryption (PKE) scheme, and any
PEKS scheme in a black-box manner.
In the key-insulation model, the public key remains
fixed while the secret key can be updated if needed.
Namely, this model is more practical than the key-
evolution model in the sense of practical usage. To give
a generic construction of a KU-PEKS scheme, we in-
troduce a new key-insulated cryptographic protocol, a
key-insulated identity-based encryption for master keys
(“MIKE” for short), which has similar key-insulated
functionality to key-insulated IBE [20,30]. MIKE re-
alizes the key-insulated functionality for master keys.
A master key for a cryptoperiod i generates the users’
decryption key for i, which can be used to decrypt ci-
phertexts encrypted for i. Even if a master key for a
cryptoperiod i is exposed, it does not affect master
keys for other cryptoperiods (i.e., no information on
master keys and decryption keys for other cryptoperi-
ods is leaked from the exposed master key). We believe
this new primitive is of independent interest. We show
a generic construction of a KU-PEKS scheme in this
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model from any collision-resistant hash function, any
key-insulated PKE (KI-PKE) [15,28], and any anony-
mous MIKE scheme, which is instantiated under the
symmetric external Diffie-Hellman (SXDH) assumption
in Section 6.
Implementation using Raspberry Pi. To show prac-
tical efficiency, we implement our proposals on Rasp-
berry Pi 3, which can be regarded as a reasonable plat-
form for IoT devices, in Section 5. Specifically, we in-
stantiate our generic constructions in the both models
in three ways. The first instantiation (secure in the key-
evolution model with random oracles) employs ElGa-
mal PKE [17] and a PEKS scheme from Boneh-Franklin
identity-based encryption (IBE) [8]. By employing ex-
isting anonymous IBE schemes secure in the standard
model (e.g., [23]) instead of Boneh-Franklin IBE, we
also obtain the second instantiation without random
oracles. The third, which is secure in the key insulation
model without random oracles, employs Watanabe-Shikata
KI-PKE [28] and the proposed direct construction of an
anonymous MIKE scheme (in Section 6).
The summary of our implementation results is as
follows. The first (the key-evolution model) is the most
efficient in terms of running time. On the other hand,
the third (the key insulation model) requires relatively
longer running time for the setup and key update algo-
rithms, whereas, as mentioned earlier, the key insula-
tion model is more practical in the sense that the public
key is never changed. Nonetheless, we consider it appli-
cable for IoT devices since those algorithms are rarely
called.
1.2 Related Work
We should look into the three kinds of previous re-
searches related our key-updating functionality: forward-
secure, key-insulated, and intrusion-resilient cryptogra-
phy. In forward-secure PKE, which was introduced by
Canetti et al. [11], the secret key is updated for each
cryptoperiod. Even if the secret key for a cryptoperiod i
is exposed, ciphertexts encrypted before i still preserves
the confidentiality. As described earlier, Tang [29] pro-
posed forward-secure PEKS, however it is inefficient.
In KI-PKE introduced by Dodis et al. [15], a receiver
has two kinds of secret keys: a decryption and a helper
key. These kinds of secret keys are stored in different
devices such as a smartphone and USB pen drive. Un-
like forward-secure PKE, the decryption key is updated
with the aid of the helper key. The exposure of the de-
cryption key for a cryptoperiod does not affect keys for
other cryptoperiods; the exposed key is useless to get
plaintexts encrypted during other cryptoperiods. Dodis
et al. [14] developed intrusion-resilient PKE that simul-
taneously realizes forward security and key insulation.
This rich security notion was attained paying the cost
of computational amount and ciphertext length.
Proxy re-encryption (PRE) [5], especially identity-
based PRE (IB-PRE) [19], might have a possibility of
achieving a similar key-updating functionality. That is,
KU-PEKS might be constructed from IB-PRE by re-
garding users in IB-PRE as cryptoperiods in KU-PEKS;
re-encrypting a ciphertext for a user i into that for a
user j can be considered as re-encrypting it for a cryp-
toperiod i into that for j. However, the underlying IB-
PRE scheme must satisfy multi-hopping, unidirection-
ality, and anonymity to yield a KU-PEKS scheme satis-
fying our requirements. Unfortunately, there is no such
an IB-PRE scheme so far, and this approach seems an
inappropriate direction to pursue.
As for PEKS, researchers have studied additional
functionality and security notions such as no use of
secure channels [4] and the security against keyword
guessing attacks [10]. Especially, Emura et al. gave the
revocation functionality for trapdoors [18], but their
scheme supports neither revocation nor key-updating
functionality for users’ secret keys.
1.3 Refinements
This paper is the full version of [3]. This version con-
tains the following new results which did not appear in
the proceedings version.
1. Improvement of our constructions. Previous
constructions in the both models reveal the under-
lying keywords when re-encrypting ciphertexts. It
does not violate the security definitions since an
adversary (i.e., a malicious server) can get all the
old secret keys, which means that it can decrypt
all the old ciphertexts. However, it is problematic
that even an honest server finds out the underly-
ing keywords of old ciphertexts. In this version, to
circumvent the problem, we improve the previous
constructions by using collision-resistant hash func-
tion families. Specifically, keywords are hashed be-
fore encrypting them and generating trapdoors for
them. In other words, secure search is performed
via the encrypted hash value of keywords. Conse-
quently, the server just finds out the hash values of
the underlying keywords when re-encrypting them.
Nonetheless, we note that this improvement does
not perfectly resolve the problem since the server
can still try to guess the underlying keywords by
computing their hash values. In fact, we just prove
4 For personal use only: DO NOT DISTRIBUTE!
that the improved construction formally meets the
same security definition as in [3].
2. Implementation results for IoT environments.
In the proceedings version, we provided implemen-
tation for the first instantiation on normal environ-
ments (i.e., on PC). In this version, we implement
all three instantiations on Raspberry Pi 3.
3. A concrete anonymous MIKE scheme. In the
proceedings version, we skipped a direct construc-
tion of an anonymous MIKE scheme under the SXDH
assumption. In this version, we give the full descrip-
tion of it as well as the security proof.
2 Preliminaries
Notation. For any positive integer i, let [i] be {1, . . . , i}.
We denote by x ← A(y) assigning y to the input of a
probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm A on
an output x. We denote by x ← AO(y) A using an
oracle O to output x. If S is a finite set, we denote
by x
$← S sampling x uniformly at random from S.
Hereafter, we use the term of time periods, instead of
cryptoperiods, as in the previous works [20,30], and let
T := {1, 2, . . . , poly(λ)} be a set of time periods for
simplicity.
2.1 Public-key Encryption
Public-key encryption (PKE) PKE = (PG,G,E,D) is
defined as follows.
– PG(1λ)→ parpke: given the security parameter 1λ,
it outputs a public parameter parpke.
– G(parpke) → (ek, dk): given parpke, it outputs an
encryption key ek and a decryption key dk.
– E(ek,m) → ct: given ek and a plaintext m ∈ M,
it outputs a ciphertext ct, whereM is a plaintext
space determined by the security parameter.
– D(dk, ct) → m or ⊥: given dk and ct, it outputs
m or ⊥, where ⊥ indicates decryption failure.
We require PKE satisfies the following correctness: For
all λ ∈ N, all m ∈ M, all parpke ← PG(1λ), and all
(dk, ek)← G(parpke), it holds D(dk,E(ek,m)) = m.
We describe a security notion of indistinguishability
against chosen plaintext attacks (IND-CPA). Let A be





parpke ← PG(1λ), (dk, ek)← G(parpke)
(m∗0,m
∗
1, state)← A(parpke, ek) s.t. |m∗0| = |m∗1|
b
$← {0, 1}, ct∗b ← E(ek,m∗b)
b′ ← A(state, ct∗b)
if b′ = b return 1 else return 0 
Definition 1 (IND-CPA) A PKE scheme PKE is said
to be IND-CPA secure if for all PPT adversaries A, its
advantage AdvCPAPKE,A(1
λ) := |Pr[ExpCPAPKE,A(1λ) = 1] −
1/2| is negligible in λ.
2.2 Key-Insulated Public-key Encryption
Key-insulated public-key encryption (KI-PKE) KIE =
(KIKG,KIUG,KIU,KIE,KID) is defined as follows.
– KIKG(1λ)→ (EK,DK0,HK): given the security pa-
rameter 1λ, it outputs an encryption key EK, an
initial decryption key DK0, and a helper key HK.
– KIUG(HK, i) → UPi: given HK and a time period
i ∈ T , it outputs update information UPi.
– KIU(DKi′ ,UPi)→ DKi: given DKi′ for a time pe-
riod i′ ∈ T and UPi, it outputs an updated de-
cryption key DKi for a time period i ∈ T .
– KIE(EK,m, i)→ Ci: given EK, a plaintextm ∈M,
and a current time period i ∈ T , it outputs a
ciphertext Ci for i, whereM is a plaintext space
determined by λ.
– KID(DKi,Ci) → m or ⊥: given DKi for a time
period i ∈ T and Ci for the same time period
as input, it outputs m or ⊥, where ⊥ indicates
decryption failure.
We require KIE satisfies the following correctness: For
all λ ∈ N, all m ∈ M, all (EK,DK0,HK) ← KIKG(1λ),
and all i ∈ T , it holds that KID(DKi,KIE(EK,m, i)) =
m, where DKi is any decryption key for i correctly gen-
erated by KIUG and KIU.
We describe a KI-PKE version of IND-CPA, which
is called IND-KI-CPA for short [15]. Let A be a PPT









∗, state)← AO(EK) s.t. |m∗0| = |m∗1|
b
$← {0, 1}, C∗i∗,b ← KIE(EK,m∗b , i∗)
b′ ← AO(state,C∗i∗,b)
if b′ = b return 1 else return 0 
A can access an oracle O, which is defined as follows:
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Let L := ∅. For a query i ∈ T ∪ {⋆}, O returns DKi by
computing KIU(DK0,KIUG(HK, i)) if i ∈ T \ {i∗} and
⋆ /∈ L and adds i to L. Else if i = ⋆ and L = ∅, it
returns HK and adds ⋆ to L. Otherwise, it returns ⊥.
This oracle captures thatA can obtain either (a number
of) decryption keys or the helper key (not both).
Definition 2 (IND-KI-CPA) A KI-PKE scheme KIE
is said to be IND-KI-CPA secure if for all PPT adver-
saries A, AdvKI-CPAKIE,A(1λ) := |Pr[Exp
KI-CPA
KIE,A(1
λ) = 1] −
1/2| is negligible in λ.
2.3 Public-key Encryption with Keyword Search
Public-key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) PEKS
= (Setuppeks,KeyGenpeks,Encpeks,Trapdoorpeks,Testpeks)
is defined as follows.
– Setuppeks(1
λ) → parpeks: given the security pa-
rameter 1λ, it outputs a public parameter parpeks.
– KeyGenpeks(parpeks) → (mpk,msk): given parpeks,
it outputs a public key mpk and a secret key msk.
– Encpeks(mpk, w)→ ctw: given mpk and a keyword
w ∈ W, it outputs a ciphertext ctw, where W is a
keyword space determined by the security param-
eter.
– Trapdoorpeks(mpk,msk, w
′)→ tw′ : givenmpk,msk,
and a keyword w′ ∈ W, it outputs a trapdoor tw′ .
– Testpeks(mpk, tw′ , ctw) → 1 or 0: given mpk, tw′ ,
and ctw, it outputs 1, which indicates “keyword
match”, or 0.
We require PEKS satisfies the following correctness:
For all λ ∈ N, all w ∈ W, parpeks ← Setuppeks(1λ), all
(msk,mpk)← KeyGenpeks(parpeks), it holds Testpeks(mpk,
Trapdoorpeks(mpk,msk, w),Encpeks(mpk, w))→ 1.
We describe security notions for PEKS, indistin-
guishability against chosen keyword attacks (IND-CKA)
and Computational Consistency.
For any PPT adversary A, we consider the following
experiment ExpCKAPEKS,A(1







1 , state)← AOtd(parpeks,mpk) s.t. |w∗0 | = |w∗1 |
b
$← {0, 1}, ct∗w∗b ← Encpeks(mpk, w
∗
b )
b′ ← AOtd(state, ct∗w∗b )
if b′ = b return 1 else return 0 
A can access an oracle Otd which receives w(∈ W \
{w∗0 , w∗1}), and returns Trapdoorpeks(msk, w).
Definition 3 (IND-CKA [2]) A PEKS scheme PEKS
is said to be IND-CKA secure if for all PPT adversaries




= 1]− 1/2| is negligible in λ.
We next define Computational Consistency. We also
consider the following experiment ExpConsPEKS,A(1
λ) for







1)← A(parpeks,mpk) s.t. |w∗0 | = |w∗1 |
ct∗w∗0 ← Encpeks(mpk, w
∗
0)
tw∗1 ← Trapdoorpeks(msk, w
∗
1)
if Testpeks(tw∗1 , ctw∗0 ) = 1 and w
∗
0 ̸= w∗1 return 1
else return 0 
Definition 4 (Computational Consistency [2]) A PEKS
scheme PEKS is said to be IND-CKA secure if for all
PPT adversaries A, its advantage AdvConsPEKS,A(1λ) :=
Pr[ExpConsPEKS,A(1
λ) = 1] is negligible in λ.
2.4 Hash Function Family
A hash function family H is a family of functions H :
X → Y that compress a string of an arbitrary length
into a shorter constant string, and the size ofH depends
on a security parameter λ. We define Collision Resistance






if (x, x∗) ∈ X 2 ∧ x ̸= x∗ ∧ H(x) = H(x∗)
then return 1 else return 0 
Definition 5 (Collision Resistance) A family of hash
functions H is said to satisfy Collision Resistance if for
all PPT adversaries A, its advantage AdvCRH,A(1λ) :=
Pr[ExpCRH,A(1
λ) = 1] is negligible in λ.
3 KU-PEKS in the Key-evolution Model
We introduce the first framework of KU-PEKS, which is
called a key-evolution model. Roughly speaking, in the
key-evolution model, both of a public key and a secret
key are updated periodically. We believe that this is one
of the most likely models that ones naturally come up
with “PEKS with key-updating functionality”.
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3.1 Model
KU-PEKS in the key-evolution model is executed as fol-
lows. A user first runs KE.Setup to generate a public key
pk1 and a secret key sk1. An i-th key pair (pki, ski) can
be updated by KE.Upd if needed (i.e., ski is exposed),
and KE.Upd outputs an updated key pair (pki+1, ski+1)
and a re-encryption key rki→i+1. The re-encryption key
rki→i+1 is sent to the server via a secure channel (we will
explain how to use rki→i+1 later). Nobody (except for
the user) can correctly guess the new secret key ski+1
from old keys (Requirement 1). Suppose that the cur-
rent time period is i. As in PEKS, another user who
wants to store an encrypted keyword in a server exe-
cutes KE.Enc with the i-th public key pki and a keyword
w, and gets a ciphertext (or, an encrypted keyword)
c
(0)
w,i, which is stored in the server. To search a keyword
w′, the user runs KE.Trapdoor with ski and w
′ and gets a
trapdoor tw′,i, which is sent to the server via the secure
channel. The server uses tw′,i to search for the keyword
w′ over stored ciphertexts. Specifically, KE.Test is ex-
ecuted with tw′,i and c
(k)
w,j such that j + k = i, where
j indicates a time period when it is generated and k
indicates the number of updates. KE.Test outputs 1 if
w′ = w holds (i.e., the search keyword matches the en-
crypted keyword), or outputs 0 otherwise. Note that
the server only gets correct search results if and only
if j + k = i. In other words, KE.Test never outputs 1
if the trapdoor is old, i.e., j + k > i (Requirement
3). The server returns the search result to the user.
In addition, the server can use re-encryption keys to
update ciphertexts encrypted during the previous time
period. More specifically, the server updates a cipher-
text c
(k)
w,j such that j+k = i, by running KE.ReEnc with
rki→i+1, and gets an updated ciphertext c
(k+1)
w,j . There-
fore, the user can search previously-encrypted keywords
(Requirement 2).
Formally, KU-PEKS in the key-evolution modelΠke
= (KE.Setup,KE.Upd,KE.Enc,KE.ReEnc,KE.Trapdoor,
KE.Test) is defined as follows.
– KE.Setup(1λ) → (pk1, sk1): given the security pa-
rameter 1λ, it outputs an initial key pair (pk1, sk1).
– KE.Upd(pki, ski) → (pki+1, ski+1, rki→i+1): given
a key pair (ski, pki) for a time period i ∈ T , it
outputs an updated key pair (pki+1, ski+1) for a
next time period i + 1 ∈ T and a re-encryption
key rki→i+1.
– KE.Enc(pki, w) → c
(0)
w,i: given the public key pki
and a keyword w ∈ W, it outputs a ciphertext
c
(0)
w,i. The superscript of the ciphertext indicates
the number of updates, and hence is 0 at this
point.





pki+1, the re-encryption key rki→i+1 and a cipher-
text c
(k)
w,j , it outputs an updated ciphertext c
(k+1)
w,j
if j + k = i holds.2 Otherwise, it outputs ⊥.
– KE.Trapdoor(pki, ski, w
′) → tw′,i: given pki, the
secret key ski, and a keyword w
′ ∈ W, it outputs
a trapdoor tw′,i (for time period i ∈ T ).
– KE.Test(pki, tw′,i, c
(k)
w,j)→ 1 or 0: given pki, a trap-
door tw′,i, and a ciphertext c
(k)
w,j , it outputs 1 if
w = w′ and j + k = i. Otherwise, it outputs 0.
We require Πke satisfies the following correctness.
For all λ ∈ N, all i ∈ T , all j ∈ [i− 1], all (pk1, sk1)←
KE.Setup(1λ), all (pkℓ, skℓ, rkℓ−1→ℓ) ← KE.Upd(pkℓ−1,
skℓ−1) (2 ≤ ℓ ≤ i), and all w ∈ W, it holds KE.Test(pki,
KE.Trapdoor(pki, ski, w), c
(i−j)
w,j ) → 1, where c
(i−j)
w,j ←
KE.ReEnc(pki, rki−1→i,KE.ReEnc(· · · KE.ReEnc(pkj+1,
rkj→j+1,KE.Enc(pkj , w)) · · · )). It means that KE.Test
always outputs 1 if the search keyword matches the en-
crypted keyword and the ciphertext is generated for j
and updated i− j times when the version of the secret
key is i.
We next define security of KU-PEKS in the key-
evolution model. We consider security against an honest-
but-curious server that obtains all leaked secret keys
and re-encryption keys. As in traditional PEKS, we con-
sider notions of indistinguishability against chosen key-
word attacks in the key-evolution model (IND-KE-CKA)
and computational consistency in the key-evolution model
(KE-Computational Consistency).
First, we define IND-KE-CKA security. Let A be a




ctr := 1, (pk1, sk1)← KE.Setup(1λ)
(w∗0 , w
∗
1 , state)← AOkg,Okl,Otd(pk1) s.t. |w∗0 | = |w∗1 |
ctr∗ := ctr, b
$← {0, 1}, c(0)w∗b ,ctr∗ ← KE.Enc(pkctr∗ , w
∗
b )
b′ ← AOkl,Otd(state, c(0)w∗b ,ctr∗)
if b′ = b return 1 else return 0 
In this game, A can access a set of the following oracles
Okg,Okl,Otd.
Okg: Initially, let SK := ∅. For A’s request, Okg com-
putes (pkctr+1, skctr+1, rkctr→ctr+1)← KE.Upd(pkctr, skctr),
and returns (pkctr+1, rkctr→ctr+1) to A. Then, skctr+1
is added to SK, and ctr := ctr + 1.
2 For simplicity, we assume that the information of i, j, and
k is attached to tw′,i and c
(k)
w,j .
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Okl: For a query i ∈ T , Okl returns ski ∈ SK if i <
ctr. Otherwise, Okl returns ⊥. Note that this oracle
captures key leakage.
Otd: For (w, i) ∈ W×T , Otd returns KE.Trapdoor(ski,
w) if i ≤ ctr and (w, i) /∈ {(w∗0 , ctr), (w∗1 , ctr)}. Oth-
erwise, Otd returns ⊥.
Definition 6 (IND-KE-CKA) A KU-PEKS scheme Πke
is said to be IND-KE-CKA secure if for all PPT ad-
versaries A, AdvKE-CKAΠke,A (1
λ) := |Pr[ExpKE-CKAΠke,A (1
λ) =
1]− 1/2| is negligible in λ.
Next, we define KE-Computational Consistency. For









s.t. |w∗0 | = |w∗1 | and j∗ + k∗ = ctr
ctr∗ := ctr, c
(0)
w∗0 ,j
∗ ← KE.Enc(pkj∗ , w∗0)








tdw∗1 ,ctr ← KE.Trapdoor(pkctr∗ , skctr∗ , w
∗
1)
if KE.Test(tdw∗1 ,ctr∗ , c
(k∗)
w∗0 ,j
∗) = 1 ∧ w∗0 ̸= w∗1 return 1
else return 0 
In the above game, A can access Okg and Okl, which
are the same as the IND-KE-CKA game.
Definition 7 (KE-Computational Consistency) A KU-
PEKS scheme Πke is said to meet KE-Computational
Consistency if for all PPT adversaries A, its advantage
AdvKE-ConsΠke,A (1
λ) := Pr[ExpKE-ConsΠke,A (1
λ) = 1] is negligible
in λ.
3.2 Generic Construction
In this section, we show a generic construction of a KU-
PEKS scheme Πke in the key-evolution model from a
PKE scheme, a PEKS scheme, and a family of hash
functions. Let PKE = (PG,G,E,D), PEKS = (Setuppeks,
KeyGenpeks,Encpeks,Trapdoorpeks,Testpeks) and H be a
PKE scheme, a PEKS scheme, and a hash function fam-
ily, respectively. Our construction is given in Fig. 1.
Theorem 1 If PKE is IND-CPA secure, H meets Col-
lision Resistance, and PEKS is IND-CKA secure and
meets Computational Consistency, the KU-PEKS scheme
Πke given in Fig. 1 is IND-KE-CKA secure and meets
KE-Computational Consistency.
Proof Let G0 be Exp
KE-CKA
Πke,A , and we write Exp
KE-CKA
Πke,A →
1 (i.e., an event that b′ = b in G0) as S0. We define the
following games G1,G2,G3, and also define S1,S2,S3 in
the same manner.
Let Col be an event that in the challenge phase, A
submits w∗0 and w
∗





we can easily show that Pr[S0 ∧ Col] = AdvCRH,B(1λ).
G1: This is the same as G0 except that Col does not
occur and the challenger guesses i∗ ∈ T such that
ctr∗ = i∗ at the beginning of the game. This modi-
fication does not affect any distributions, and there-
fore Pr[S0 ∧ ¬Col] = Pr[S1]. Let Fail be an event that
ctr∗ ̸= i∗ (i.e., an event that the challenger eventually
fails to guess correct i∗). Note that Fail and S1 are in-
dependent.
G2: This is the same as G1 except that the challenger
replaces a random bit with A’s output b′ regardless of
A’s actual output if Fail occurs. Since Pr[S1] = Pr[S1 |
¬Fail] = Pr[S2 | ¬Fail], we have Pr[S1] − 1/2 = Pr[S2 |
¬Fail]− 1/2.
G3: This is the same as G2 except that in the challenge
phase, the challenger computes ct∗ctr ← E(ekctr, 0|w
∗
b |)








Then, the rest of the proof follows the following lem-
mas. The proofs are given in Appendices A and B, re-
spectively.
Lemma 1 |Pr[S2 | ¬Fail]− Pr[S3 | ¬Fail]| = 2·AdvCPAPKE,B(1λ).









Similarly, we can show KE-Computational Consistency.
Let G′0 be Exp
KE-Cons
Πke,A , and we write Exp
KE-Cons
Πke,A → 1 as
S′0. We define the following game G
′
1 and also define S
′
1
in the same manner.
Let Col be the same event as above. Namely, in
the challenge phase, A submits w∗0 and w∗1 such that
H(w∗0) = H(w
∗






G′1: This is the same as G
′
0 except that Col does not
occur and the challenger guesses i∗ ∈ T such that
ctr∗ = i∗ at the beginning of the game. This modi-
fication does not affect any distributions, and there-
fore Pr[S′0 ∧ ¬Col] = Pr[S′1]. Let Fail be the same event
as above. Note that Fail and S′1 are independent, and












parse pki = (parpke, parpeks,H, eki,mpki)
parse ski = (dki,mski)
(eki+1, dki+1)← G(parpke)
(mpki+1,mski+1)← KeyGenpeks(parpeks)
pki+1 := (parpke, parpeks,H, eki+1,mpki+1)
ski+1 := (dki+1,mski+1)
rki→i+1 := dki
return (pki+1, ski+1, rki→i+1)
KE.Enc(pki, w):
parse pki = (parpke, parpeks,H, eki,mpki)
cti ← E(eki,H(w))











parse rki→i+1 = (eki+1,mpki+1, dki)
parse c
(k)
w,j = (ctj+k, ctw,j+k)






















w,j = (ctj+k, ctw,j+k)
if i ̸= j + k
return 0
else if 1← Testpeks(mpki, tw′,i, ctw,i)
return 1
else if 0← Testpeks(mpki, tw′,i, ctw,i)
return 0
Fig. 1 A generic construction of Πke from PKE, PEKS, and H.
therefore we have Pr[S′1] = Pr[S
′
1 | Fail] = Pr[S′1 | ¬Fail].








Remark 1 As noted in the introduction, the difference
between the above construction and the previous one [3]
is whether the hash function is used or not. Thanks to
the underlying hash function, keywords are not directly
revealed in KE.ReEnc in Fig. 1. However, the server can
still guess the keywords with additional computational
cost (i.e., computing their hash values to check if they
match or not). Therefore, we can somehow argue that
the above construction is better than the previous one,
however, formally it just achieves the same level of se-
curity as in [3]. The same holds for our second construc-
tion in the next section.
4 KU-PEKS in the Key-insulation Model
Taking into account practical usage, it is desirable to
keep the same public key for the updated secret key. In
this section, we adopt the concept of key-insulated cryp-
tography [15,16], which is an well-known cryptographic
solution to the key-exposure problem, and propose the
key-insulation model as another model of KU-PEKS.
The key-insulation model achieves the property that a
public key remains the same while the secret key is up-
dated.
4.1 Model
The key-insulated protocol is said to have random ac-
cess key updates [12] if one can update any old se-
cret key to the latest version, more generally, if one
can update a secret key from any time period j ∈
T to any time period i ∈ T . Since the functional-
ity of random access key updates is a basic require-
ment in key-insulated cryptography, we also consider
it in this paper. Therefore, random access key updates
eliminate the need for sequentially updating keys (i.e.,
ski−1 → ski), and thus allow the server to manage only
one “global” time-period set T among all users (e.g.,
t1 := 1/10/2018, t2 := 2/10/2018, . . .). Note that in the
key-evolution model, the server has to manage different
time-period sets per each user (i.e., a time period set
is a counter of updates for each user). We also model
re-encryption keys so that it updates ciphertexts from
any time period to any time period since secret keys
are not sequentially updated.
KU-PEKS in the key-insulation model is executed
as follows. A user first runs KI.Setup to generate a public
key pk, an initial secret key sk0, and a helper key hk. sk0
is stored in a (relatively) powerful but insecure device
such as smartphones, and hk is stored in a physically-
secure but computationally-limited device such as USB
pen drives. The secret key ski′ for a time period i
′ ∈ T
is updated for any time period i ∈ T by ∆-Gen and
KI.Upd if needed. Specifically, the user run ∆-Gen to
compute update information δi for i with hk stored in
the physically-secure devise. They then executes KI.Upd
with δi to update ski′ to ski. The above procedure can
be done offline. KI.Upd also outputs a re-encryption key
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rki, which is sent to the server via a secure channel. Due
to the security definition, an adversaryA is only allowed
to get either the helper key hk or (a number of) de-
cryption keys {ski1 , ski2 , . . . , skiq}. Therefore, A cannot
correctly update exposed keys since A can only execute
either ∆-Gen or KI.Upd. It means that Requirement
1 is satisfied. The flows of encryption, trapdoor gener-
ation, test, and re-encryption are almost the same as
the key-evolution model (Note that any old ciphertext
ctw,j (j < i) can be updated by rki in this model).
Therefore, the key-insulation model also satisfies Re-
quirements 2 and 3.
We formally define KU-PEKS in the key-insulation
modelΠki = (KI.Setup,∆-Gen,KI.Upd,KI.Enc,KI.ReEnc,
KI.Trapdoor,KI.Test).
– KI.Setup(1λ) → (pk, sk0, hk): given the security
parameter 1λ, it outputs a public key pk, an initial
secret key sk0, and a helper key hk.
– ∆-Gen(pk, hk, i) → δi: given pk, hk, and a time
period i ∈ T , it outputs update information δi for
i.
– KI.Upd(pk, ski′ , δi) → (ski, rki): given pk, a secret
key ski′ for a time period i
′ ∈ T and δi for i ∈ T ,
it outputs an updated secret key ski and a re-
encryption key rki.
– KI.Enc(pk, w, i) → cw,i: given pk, a keyword w ∈
W, and a current time period i ∈ T , it outputs a
ciphertext cw,i.
– KI.ReEnc(pk, rki, cw,j) → cw,i or ⊥: given pk, the
re-encryption key rki for i ∈ T , and a ciphertext
cw,j encrypted during j ∈ T , it outputs an up-
dated ciphertext cw,i for i.
– KI.Trapdoor(pk, ski, w
′) → tdw′,i: given pk, a se-
cret key ski for i ∈ T , and a keyword w′ ∈ W, it
outputs a trapdoor tdw′,i for i.
– KI.Test(pk, tdw′,i, cw,i)→ 1 or 0: given pk, a trap-
door tdw′,i, and a ciphertext cw,i, it outputs 1 if
w = w′. Otherwise, it outputs 0.
We require Πki satisfies the following correctness.
For all λ ∈ N, all i, j ∈ T , all (pk, sk0, hk)← KI.Setup(1λ),
and all w ∈ W, it holds KI.Test(pk,KI.Trapdoor(pk, ski,
w), cw,i) → 1, where ski is any secret key correctly
updated from sk0, and cw,i is: (i) if j = i, cw,i ←
KI.Enc(pk, w, i); (ii) if j ̸= i, cw,i ← KI.ReEnc(pk, rki,
KI.ReEnc(· · ·KI.Enc(pk, w, j) · · · )). It means that KI.Test
always outputs 1 if the search keyword matches the en-
crypted keyword and the ciphertext is (correctly up-
dated to) the same version of the secret key.
We next define security of KU-PEKS in the key-
insulation model. As in the key-evolution model, we
consider security against an honest-but-curious server
that obtains all leaked secret keys and re-encryption
keys, that is, we define notions of indistinguishability
against chosen keyword attacks in the key-insulation
model (IND-KI-CKA) and computational consistency in
the key-insulation model (KI-Computational Consistency).
First, we define IND-KI-CKA security. Let A be a








∗, state)← AOkl,Ork,Otd(pk) s.t. |w∗0 | = |w∗1 |
b




b′ ← AOkl,Ork,Otd(state, cw∗b ,i∗)
if b′ = b return 1 else return 0 
A can access sets of oracles Okl,Ork,Otd, and each
oracle is defined as follows. Initially, it sets L := ∅ and
RK := ∅.
Okl: For a query i ∈ T ∪{⋆}, if i /∈ T \{i∗} and ⋆ /∈ L,
Okl computes (ski, rki)← KI.Upd(pk, sk0,∆-Gen(pk,
hk, i)), returns ski, and adds i and rki to L and RK,
respectively. Else if i = ⋆ and L = ∅, Okl then re-
turns hk and adds ⋆ to L. Otherwise, Okl returns
⊥. Note that this oracle captures key leakage, and
A obtains either (a number of) decryption keys or
the helper key during the game.
Ork: For a query i ∈ T , Ork returns rki ∈ RK if i ∈ L.3
Otd: For (w, i) ∈ W×T ,Otd returns KI.Trapdoor(pk, ski,
w) if (w, i) /∈ {(w∗0 , i∗), (w∗1 , i∗)}. Otherwise, it re-
turns ⊥.
Definition 8 (IND-KI-CKA) A KU-PEKS scheme Πki
is said to be IND-KI-CKA secure if for all PPT adver-
saries A, AdvKI-CKAΠki,A (1
λ) := |Pr[ExpKI-CKAΠki,A (1
λ) = 1] −
1/2| is negligible in λ.
Next, we define KI-Computational Consistency. For
any PPT adversary A, we consider the following game.
ExpKI-ConsΠki,A (1
λ) 




∗, j∗)← AOkl,Ork(pk) s.t. |w∗0 | = |w∗1 |




(skj∗ , rkj∗)← KI.Upd(sk0,∆-Gen(pk, hk, j∗))
tdw∗1 ,j∗ ← KI.Trapdoor(pk, skj∗ , w
∗
1)
if KI.Test(tdw∗1 ,j∗ , cw∗0 ,i∗) = 1 ∧ w
∗
0 ̸= w∗1 return 1
else return 0 
A can access Okl and Ork, which are the same as those
in the IND-KI-CKA game.
3 For simplicity, we assume A issues i ∈ T to Ork after A
issues i to Okl except  L = {⋆} (i.e., A obtains hk from Okl).
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Definition 9 (KI-Computational Consistency) A KU-
PEKS scheme Πki is said to meet KI-Computational
Consistency if for all PPT adversaries A, its advantage
AdvKI-ConsΠki,A (1
λ) := Pr[ExpKI-ConsΠki,A (1
λ) = 1] is negligible in
λ.
4.2 Building Block: Anonymous Key-insulated IBE for
Master Keys
We take a similar strategy for the key-insulation model
as in Abdalla et al.’s work [2], which showed the trans-
formation from an anonymous IBE scheme to a PEKS
scheme. Namely, we consider a transformation from an
anonymous IBE scheme with certain key-insulated func-
tionality to a KU-PEKS scheme (in the key-insulation
model). Key-insulated IBE (KI-IBE, or IKE for short) [20,
30] is a promising candidate, however, (i) the existing
scheme is not anonymous, and (ii) the key-insulated
functionality is insufficient to realize key-insulated func-
tionality of KU-PEKS. Let us elaborate the latter. In
the Abdalla et al. transformation, a master key of an
IBE scheme turns to be a secret key of the resulting
PEKS scheme, and secret keys of the IBE scheme are
used as trapdoors of the PEKS scheme. However, the
existing IKE schemes [20,30] have key-insulated func-
tionality for users’ secret keys. Therefore, if we apply
the the Abdalla et al. transformation to those IKE
schemes, then we just get a PEKS scheme with key-
insulated functionality for trapdoors. Actually, Emura
et al. [18] applied the Abdalla et al. transformation from
a revocable IBE scheme [6,24,27], which is an IBE en-
abling the central authority to efficiently revoke secret
keys, to a PEKS scheme with revocation functionality
for trapdoors.
Thus, we here introduce a new key-insulated cryp-
tographic primitive, IKE for master keys (MIKE for
short). Roughly speaking, MIKE captures leakage of
the master key, whereas IKE focuses on leakage of users’
secret keys. This primitive may be of independent in-
terest. We also consider the anonymity of MIKE since
Abdalla et al. transformation requires the underlying
IBE scheme to be anonymous.
A MIKE scheme MIKE consists of six-tuple algo-
rithms (Init,UpdGen,MKUpd,KG, IBEnc, IBDec) defined
as follows.
– Init(1λ) → (prms,mk0,mhk): given the security pa-
rameter 1λ, it outputs a public parameter prms, an
initial master secret key mk0, and a master helper
key mhk.
– UpdGen(prms,mhk, T) → upT: given prms, mhk, and
a time period T ∈ T , it outputs update information
upT for T.
– MKUpd(prms,mkT′ , upT) → mkT: given prms, mkT′ ,
and upT, it outputs an updated master key mkT.
– KG(prms,mkT, I) → dkT,I: given prms, mkT, and an
identity I ∈ I, it outputs a decryption key dkT,I for
I and the time period T.
– IBEnc(prms,m, T, I)→ ctT,I: given prms, a plaintext
m ∈ M, a current time period T, and I ∈ I, it
outputs a ciphertext ctT,I.
– IBDec(prms, dkT,I, ctT,I)→ m or⊥: given prms, dkT,I,
and ctT,I, it outputs m or ⊥.
We requireMIKE meets the following correctness prop-
erty: For all λ ∈ N, all (prms,mk0,mhk) ← Init(1λ), all
M ∈ M, all I ∈ I, all T, T′ ∈ T , it holds that M ←
IBDec(prms,KG(prms,MKUpd(prms,mkT′ ,UpdGen(prms,
mhk, T)), I), IBEnc(prms,M, T, I)).
Security. We consider two kinds of security notions
of MIKE: indistinguishability against key exposure and
chosen plaintext attacks for MIKE (IND-ID-KI-CPA) and
anonymity (ANO-ID-KI-CPA).
First, we define IND-ID-KI-CPA security. Let A be a








∗, I∗, state)← AOext,Oleak(prms)
s.t. |m∗0| = |m∗1|
b
$← {0, 1}, ctT∗,I∗ ← IBEnc(prms,m∗b , T∗, I∗)
b′ ← AOext,Oleak(state, ctT∗,I∗)
if b′ = b return 1 else return 0 
A can access the following two oracles Oext and Oleak,
which are defined as follows.
Oext: For a query (T, I) ∈ T × I from A, Oext recalls
mkT if it is already generated. Otherwise, Oext com-
putes mkT ← MKUpd(mk0,UpdGen(mhk, T)), and
stores it. Oext then returns KG(mkT, I) if (T, I) ̸=
(T∗, I∗) in ExpID-KI-CPAMIKE,A(1
λ).
Oleak: Let L := ∅ be an initial list. For a query T ∈ T ∪
{⋆},Oleak returnsmkT if T /∈ T \{T∗} and ⋆ /∈ L, and
adds T to L.4 Else if T = ⋆ and L = ∅, Oleak returns
mhk, and adds ⋆ to L. Otherwise, Oleak returns ⊥.
Definition 10 (IND-ID-KI-CPA) MIKE is said to be
IND-ID-KI-CPA secure if for all PPT adversaries A,
AdvID-KI-CPAMIKE,A(1
λ) := |Pr[ExpID-KI-CPAMIKE,A(1λ) = 1] − 1/2| is
negligible in λ.
We next define ANO-ID-KI-CPA security. We con-
sider the following experiment for any PPT adversary
A.
4 If mkT is not stored, Oleak generates it by
MKUpd(mk0,UpdGen(mhk, T)) and stored it.








$← {0, 1}, ctT∗,I∗b ← IBEnc(prms,m
∗, T∗, I∗b)
b′ ← AOext,Oleak(state, ctT∗,I∗b )
if b′ = b return 1 else return 0 
A can access the same oracles as those in the IND-ID-KI-
CPA game. Note that the restriction of Oext should be
changed as follows: Oext returns KG(mkT, I) if (T, I) ∈
{(T∗, I∗0), (T∗, I∗1)}.
Definition 11 (ANO-ID-KI-CPA) MIKE is said to be
ANO-ID-KI-CPA secure if for all PPT adversaries A,
AdvANO-KI-CPAMIKE,A (1
λ) := |Pr[ExpANO-KI-CPAMIKE,A (1λ) = 1]− 1/2|
is negligible in λ.
Construction. We will give a concrete construction of
this new primitive from the symmetric external Diffie-
Hellman (SXDH) assumption (without random oracles)
in Section 6.
4.3 Generic Construction from KI-PKE and MIKE
In this section, we show a generic construction of a KU-
PEKS scheme Πki in the key-insulation model from any
KI-PKE scheme KIE , any anonymous MIKE scheme
MIKE , and any collusion-resistant hash function fam-
ilyH. Basically, we can constructΠki in a similar way to
the generic construction of Πke in Section 3.2. However,
the construction only achieves sequential key updates,
that is, a re-encryption key rki for i ∈ T can be used for
only updating a ciphertext cw,i−1 encrypted during the
previous period i−1 ∈ T . To achieve random access key
updates, i.e., to realize update of a ciphertext cw,j for a
time period j ∈ T to any time period i ∈ T , we adopt
the KUNode algorithm (or, the complete subtree (CS)
method), which was used for broadcast encryption [25],
revocable IBE [6], and so forth. The KUNode algorithm
is usually used for efficiently revoking malicious users,
whereas we would like to use it to efficiently realize ran-
dom access updates. Therefore, we modify the KUNode
algorithm to fit our purpose as follows (see [25,6] for
the original KUNode algorithm).
The modified KUNode algorithm. Let BTGen be an
algorithm that takes N as input, and outputs a binary
tree BT with N leaves, where N is a power of two for
simplicity. Each time period i ∈ T is assigned to a leaf
node, and the corresponding i-th leaf node is denoted
by ηi. For the sake of simplicity, we assume N = |T |.
Now the depth of BT is log |T | + 1, and the number
of all nodes is 2log |T |+1 − 1 = 2|T | − 1. Path(BT, ηi)
denotes a set of nodes on the path from a root node
to ηi. Note that it includes the root node and ηi. The
modified KUNode(BT, i) algorithm takes as input the
binary tree BT and a time period i ∈ T , and outputs a
set of nodes. The modified KUNode(BT, i) algorithm is
executed as follows. It sets X := ∅ . For each non-leaf
node θ ∈ Path(BT, ηi), it adds the left child θL of θ to
X if θL /∈ Path(BT, ηi). Finally, it outputs X . Note that
the size of X is O(log |T |).
We are ready to show our construction. Let KIE =
(KIKG,KIUG,KIU,KIE,KID) andMIKE = (Init,UpdGen,
MKUpd,KG, IBEnc, IBDec) be a KI-PKE scheme with a
set of time periods T̂ such that |T̂ | = 2|T | − 1 and a
MIKE scheme with T , respectively. Our construction of
Πki is given in Fig. 2. In this construction, we consider
the following function Lab : i ∈ T 7→ i+ |T |− 1 ∈ Z for
the modified KUNode algorithm. First, we label each
node of BT as θi (1 ≤ i ≤ 2|T | − 1) from the root
node. Hence, the root node is θ1 and leaf nodes are
θ|T |, . . . , θ2|T |−1. Then, each time period i ∈ T is stored
in a leaf node θLab(i), and we write ηi := θLab(i). More-
over, for readability, Path(BT, ηi) and KUNode(BT, i) are
regarded as a set of indices of the corresponding nodes.
Namely, we write {1, j1, j2, . . . , Lab(i)} = Path(BT, ηi)
and {h1, h2, . . . , hk} = KUNode(BT, i), instead of {θ1, θj1 ,
θj2 , . . . , θLab(i)(= ηi)} = Path(BT, ηi) and {θh1 , θh2 , . . . ,
θhk} = KUNode(BT, i), respectively.
We obtain the following theorem, and omit the proof
since it can be proved in a way similar to Theorem 1
and the Abdalla et al.’s transformation [2].
Theorem 2 If KIE is IND-KI-CPA secure, MIKE is
IND-ID-KI-CPA secure and ANO-ID-KI-CPA secure, and
H satisfies Collision Resistance, the proposed construc-
tion given in Fig. 2 is IND-KI-CKA secure and meets
KI-Computational Consistency.
5 Implementation Results
In this section, we provide the implementation results
of the following three instantiations. The first two are
instantiations of the key-evolution model, and the last
one is one of the key-insulation model:
1. Π romke : An instantiation of the key-evolution model
with ElGamal PKE [17] and Boneh-Franklin IBE [8],
which is the most popular (anonymous) IBE scheme
secure in the random oracle model.
2. Πstdke : An instantiation of the key-evolution model
with ElGamal PKE [17] and Jutla-Roy IBE [21],
which is the most efficient anonymous IBE scheme
without random oracles in terms of parameter sizes.







pk := (BT,EK, prms,H)
sk0 := (DK0,mk0)
hk := (HK,mhk)
return (pk, sk0, hk)
∆-Gen(pk, hk, i):
parse pk = (BT,EK, prms,H)
parse hk = (HK,mhk)
for ∀ℓ ∈ KUNode(BT, i)
UPℓ ← KIUG(HK, ℓ)
upi ← UpdGen(prms,mhk, i)
δi := ({UPℓ}ℓ∈KUNode(BT,i), upi)
return δi
KI.Upd(pk, ski′ , δi):
parse pk = (BT,EK, prms,H)
parse ski′ = (DK0,mki′)
parse δi = ({UPℓ}ℓ∈KUNode(BT,i), upi)
for ∀ℓ ∈ KUNode(BT, i)
DKℓ ← KIUG(DK0,UPℓ)





parse pk = (BT,EK, prms,H)
for ∀ℓ ∈ Path(BT, θLab(i)) \ {1}
// Do except for the root node θ1
ctℓ ← KIE(EK,H(w), ℓ)
R
$←M
// M: the plaintext space of MIKE
cti,w ← IBEnc(prms, R, i,H(w))
cw,i := (R, {ctℓ}ℓ∈Path(BT,θLab(i)), cti,w)
return cw,i
KI.ReEnc(pk, rki, cw,j):
parse rki = ({DKℓ}ℓ∈Θi)
// Θi = KUNode(BT, i)
parse cw,j = (R, {ctℓ}ℓ∈Θj , ctj,w)
// Θj = Path(BT, θLab(j))
if Θi ∩Θj = ∅
// It occurs if and only if i ≤ j
return ⊥
else
{ℓ∗} := Θi ∩Θj
// It contains exactly one element
H(w)← KID(DKℓ∗ , ctℓ∗)
// Do the same procedure of KI.Enc
for ∀ℓ ∈ Path(BT, θLab(i)) \ {1}
ctℓ ← KIE(EK,H(w), ℓ)
R
$←M
cti,w ← IBEnc(prms, R, i,H(w))
cw,i := (R, {ctℓ}ℓ∈Path(BT,θLab(i)), cti,w)
return cw,i
KI.Trapdoor(pk, ski, w′):
parse pk = (BT,EK, prms,H)




KI.Test(pk, tw′,i, cw,j :
parse pk = (BT,EK, prms,H)
parse cw,j = ({R, ctℓ}ℓ∈Θj , ctj,w)
if i ̸= j
return 0
else if R = IBDec(prms, tw′,i, ctj,w)
return 1
else if R ̸= IBDec(prms, tw′,i, ctj,w)
return 0
Fig. 2 A generic construction of Πki from KIE, MIKE, and H.
Table 1 Runnning time of core algorithms (unit: msec)
.
Setup Upd Enc ReEnc Trapdoor Test
Π romke 60.3 57.2 93.4 97.3 3.7 31.2
Πstdke 151.5 147.8 72.3 72.2 297.6 165.8
Πstdki 27,775.9 28,940.2 522.1 707.1 144.8 131.7
3. Πstdki : An instantiation of the key-insulation model
with Watanabe-Shikata KI-PKE [30], which is the
most efficient KI-PKE scheme, and a direct con-
struction of an anonymous MIKE scheme, which will
be provided in section 6. We set t := log |T | = 7
since we suppose that the key is updated once a
month for ten years.
All the instantiations are secure under the simple as-
sumptions, and we use SHA-256 as the underlying hash
function in each instantiation. The first one achieves the
most efficient parameters, though the security relies on
random oracles. The third one is less efficient than the
other two, however it does not require to update public
keys.
Table 1 and Fig. 3 show the running time of core
algorithms in each instantiation on Raspberry Pi (unit:
msec). Raspberry Pi is a small single-board computer,
which seems a great platform for building IoT devices.
Specifically, we employ Raspberry Pi 3 model B with
Broadcom BCM2837 (1.2 GHz) processor, 1 GB RAM,
and the Linux (Raspbian 9.1) OS. We also use the fol-
lowing libraries: TEPLA 2.0 and GMP 5.1.3. TEPLA,
which is an open source C encryption library developed
by University of Tsukuba, Japan, includes elliptic curve
computations and pairing functions. Since the running
time of Πstdki varies depending on time period i, we mea-
sure ten times randomly and obtain the average. All the
algorithms except for Setup, Upd, and ReEnc in Πstdki
can be executed in 550 msec, and hence our propos-
als seem acceptable to use on IoT devices. Note that
though Setup and Upd require more than 25 sec, they
are not relatively frequently executed.
Table 2 shows comparisons of parameter size among
three instantiations. Π romke and Π
std
ke are more efficient
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Table 2 Comparison of parameter size among instantiations of the proposed schemes. #pk, #sk, #rk, #td, and #c denote
the sizes of public keys, secret keys, re-encryption keys, trapdoors, and ciphertexts, respectively. [a, b, c, d] means that the
parameter contains a elements of Zp, b elements of G1, c elements of G2, and d elements of GT . We set t := log |T |. We assume
the plaintext space of the underlying Bone-Franklin IBE in Π romke is Zp. Asmp. stands for assumptions, and DDH1, DBDH,
and SXDH denote the decisional Diffie-Hellman, decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman, and symmetric external Diffie-Hellman






#pk #sk #rk #td #c Asmp.
Π romke Yes For each user [0, 4, 0, 0] [2, 0, 0, 0] [1, 0, 0, 0] [0, 1, 0, 0] [2, 3, 0, 0]
DDH1,
DBDH
Πstdke Yes For each user [0, 7, 0, 1] [9, 0, 1, 0] [1, 0, 0, 0] [0, 0, 5, 0] [1, 5, 0, 1] SXDH
Πstdki No global T [0, 13, 7, 1] [8, 0, 17, 0] [0, 0, O(t), 0] [0, 0, 5, 0] [2t + 1, 3t + 3, 0, t + 1] SXDH
than Πstdki since the size of ciphertexts in Π
std
ki increases
proportionally to t := log |T |, where T is the global
time-period set. However, Πstdki can keep the public key
fixed during the protocol. Moreover, when we suppose
multi-user model, the server only manages global T in
the key-insulation model, while it has to deal with mul-
tiple time-period sets to manage the updating counter
for each user in the key-evolution model. In this sense,
the key-insulation model is more practical than the key-
evolution model.
6 Direct Construction of Anonymous MIKE
We construct an anonymous MIKE scheme MIKE =
(Init,UpdGen,MKUpd, IBEnc, IBDec) over asymmetric bi-
linear groups of prime order.
Bilinear Groups. Let p be a prime, G1, G2, and GT
be multiplicative cyclic groups of order p, and g1 and g2
be (random) generators of G1 and G2, respectively. We
consider an efficiently computable and non-degenerate
bilinear map e : G1 × G2 → GT with the following
bilinear property: for any u, u′ ∈ G1 and v, v′ ∈ G2,
e(uu′, v) = e(u, v)e(u′, v) and e(u, vv′) = e(u, v)e(u, v′).
The bilinear map e is called symmetric or a “Type-1”
pairing if G1 = G2. Otherwise, it is called asymmetric.
In the asymmetric setting, e is called a “Type-2” pair-
ing if there is an efficiently computable isomorphism
either from G1 to G2 or from G2 to G1. If no efficiently
computable isomorphisms are known, then it is called
a “Type-3” pairing. We focus on the Type-3 pairing for
our construction. In our construction, we employ a bi-
linear group generator G, which is an algorithm that
takes the security parameter 1λ as input and outputs a
bilinear group (p,G1,G2,GT , g1, g2, e).
Construction. This construction is based on the exist-
ing IKE scheme [30], however we give it a twist since we
have to consider both the exposure of master keys and
the anonymity. As a result, the proposed construction
is more complicated than the existing scheme.
- Init(1λ): Run (G1,G2,GT , p, g1, g2, e)← G(1λ). Choose
xi, yi, βi, β
′
i
$← Zp with 0 ≤ i ≤ 4 and α
$← Z×p , and
set
z = e(g1, g2)
x0α−y0 , u1 := g
x1α−y1










2 for every i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 4},
By,i := g
−yi−β′i
2 for every i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 4}.
Output
prms := (g1, g
α
1 , u1, w1, h1, v1, z),
mk0 := (g2, {βi, β′i}4i=0),
mhk := (g2, {Bx,i, By,i}4i=0).
- UpdGen(prms,mhk, T): Choose s1, s2




























































upT := ({Di, Dx,i, D′x,i, D′′x,i, Dy,i, D′y,i, D′′y,i}2i=1).




Fig. 3 Comparison among instantiations of the proposed
schemes (unit: msec)































































mkT := (g2, {βi, β′i}4i=0,
{Di, Dx,i, D′x,i, D′′x,i, Dyi , D′y,i, D′′y,i}2i=1).
- KG(prms,mkT, I): Choose r ← Zp and compute
K := D1 (D2)
r
= gs1+s2r2 ,










































- IBEnc(prms,M, T, I): Choose t, tag
$← Zp. For M ∈
GT , compute












Output ctT,I := (CM , Cx, Cy, C, tag).
- IBDec(prms, dkT,I, ctT,I): Compute and output
M =











We show the decryption correctness of the above




y) and ctT,I =
(CM , Cx, Cy, C, tag) be the correctly-generated decryp-





























































































= e (g1, g2)
−t(x0α+y0) ,
which ensures the decryption correctness.
Our construction is secure under the following sym-
metric external Diffie-Hellman (SXDH) assumption. In
a nutshell, we say that the SXDH assumption holds if
the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption holds
both in G1 and in G2. It can be rephrased as “both the
DDH1 and DDH2 assumptions hold”.
Formally, those assumptions are defined as follows.
Let A be a PPT adversary, and we consider the follow-
ing game against A.
ExpDDHiG,A (1
λ) 




if b = 0 then T := gc1c2i else T := g
c1c2+µ
i
b′ ← A(D, gc1i , g
c2
i , T )
if b′ = b return 1 else return 0 
Definition 12 (DDHi assumption) We say that the
DDHi assumption relative to a generator G holds if for




= 1]− 1/2| is negligible in λ.
Definition 13 (SXDH assumption) We say that the
SXDH assumption relative to a generator G holds if both
of the DDH1 and DDH2 assumptions relative to a gen-
erator G hold.
We obtain the following theorems, and give the proofs
of them in the next subsections.
Theorem 3 If the SXDH assumption relative to G holds,
then the above MIKE schemeMIKE is IND-ID-KI-CPA
secure.
Theorem 4 If the SXDH assumption relative to G holds,
then the above MIKE schemeMIKE is ANO-ID-KI-CPA
secure.
6.1 Semi-functional Ciphertexts and Secret Keys
We prove the both of the IND-ID-KI-CPA security and
the ANO-ID-KI-CPA security by employing the dual-
system-encryption methodology [31]. Therefore, we first
define semi-functional ciphertexts and secret keys as fol-
lows.
Semi-functional Ciphertext: Suppose a normal cipher-
text ctT,I = (CM , Cx, Cy, C, tag). A semi-functional
ciphertext c̃tT,I := (C̃M , C̃x, C̃y, C̃, t̃ag) is computed
as follows.


























and t̃ag := tag, where µ
$← Z×p .
Partial Semi-functional Master Key: Suppose a normal
master key mkT = (g2, {βi, β′i}4i=0,D1,D2), where
Di := {Di, Dx,i, D′x,i, D′′x,i, Dy,i, D′y,i, D′′y,i}. A partial semi-
functional master key m̂kT := (g2, {βi, β′i}4i=0, D̂1,D2)



































































$← Zp and γ1
$← Z×p .
Semi-functional Master Key: Suppose a normal master
key mkT = (g2, {βi, β′i}4i=0,D1,D2), where Di :=
{Di, Dx,i, D′x,i, D′′x,i, Dy,i, D′y,i, D′′y,i}. A semi-functional
master key m̂kT := (g2, {βi, β′i}4i=0, D̂1, D̂2) for T,























































































2 (for i ∈ {1, 2}),
where ϕ1, ϕ2, ψ1, ψ2
$← Zp and γ1, γ2
$← Z×p .
Semi-functional Decryption Key: Suppose a normal de-















































$← Zp and γ
$← Z×p . Note that s is internal
randomness of dkT,I.
Note that decryption keys generated from a (partial)
semi-functional master key is also semi-functional. We




is needed in addition to the public parameter. A semi-
functional ciphertext for I for T can be decrypted with












where 1GT is the identity element of GT . Also, a nor-
mal ciphertext can be decrypted with a semi-functional











2 ) = 1GT .
6.2 Proof of Theorem 3
We prove the theorem through a sequence of games. We
first define the following games:
GameReal: This is the same as the IND-ID-KI-CPA game.
Game0: This is the same as GameReal except that the
challenge ciphertext is semi-functional.
Game1,k (1 ≤ k ≤ qT ): This is the same as Game0 ex-
cept for the following modification: Let qT be the
maximum number of time-periods issued to the or-
acle Oleak, and T(i) (1 ≤ i ≤ qT ) be an i-th time-
period issued to the oracle. If queries regarding the
first k time-periods T(1), . . . , T(k) are issued, then
partial semi-functional master keys are returned.
The rest of keys (i.e., keys regarding T(k+1), . . . , T(qT ))
are normal. Note that all the decryption keys re-
turned from the oracle Oext are normal.
Game2,k (1 ≤ k ≤ qT ): This is the same as Game1,qT
except for the following modification: If queries re-
garding the first k time-periods T(1), . . . , T(k) are is-
sued to the oracle Oleak, then semi-functional mas-
ter keys are returned. The rest of master keys are
partial semi-functional. Note that all the decryption
keys returned from the oracle Oext are still normal.
Game3,k (1 ≤ k ≤ qI): This is the same as Game2,qT ex-
cept for the following modification: Let qI be the
maximum number of queries issued to the oracle
Oext, and (T(ij), I(ij)) (1 ≤ j ≤ qI) be an j-th query
issued to the oracle. If queries regarding the first k
queries (T(i1), I(i1)), (T(i2), I(i2)), . . . , (T(ik), I(ik)) are
issued to the oracle Oext, then semi-functional de-
cryption keys are returned. The rest of decryption
keys are normal.
GameFinal: This is the same as Game2,q except that the
challenge ciphertext is a semi-functional one of a
random element of GT .
Let SReal, S1,k (0 ≤ k ≤ qT ), S2,k (0 ≤ k ≤ qT ),
S3,k (0 ≤ k ≤ qI), and SFinal be the probabilities that
the event b′ = b occurs in GameReal, Game1,k, Game2,k,














|S3,i−1 − S3,i|+ |S3,q − SFinal|,
where S1,0 := S0, S2,0 := S1,q, and S3,0 := S2,q. The
rest of the proof follows from the following lemmas.
Lemma 3 |SReal − S0| ≤ 2AdvDDH1G,B (1λ).





1 , g2, T ) of the DDH1 problem. Then,
B randomly chooses xi, yi
$← Zp with i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 4},
and creates
z := e(gc11 , g2)
x0e(g1, g2)















B sends prms := (g1, gα1 , u1, w1, h1, v1, z) to A. B also
chooses βi, β
′
i,← Zp with i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 4}. Note that B
knows a master helper key mhk and an initial master
key mk0, and we implicitly set α := c1.
B can simulate all the oracles since B knows mhk
and mk0.
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In the challenge phase, B receives (M∗0 ,M∗1 , I∗, T∗)

















B sends C∗T∗,I∗ := (C∗M , C∗x, C∗y , C∗, tag∗) to A.
If b = 0, then the above ciphertext is normal by
setting t := c2. If b = 1, then the above ciphertext is






























After receiving d′ from A, B sends b′ = 1 to the
challenger of the DDH1 problem if d′ = d. Otherwise,
B sends b′ = 0 to the challenger. ⊓⊔
Lemma 4 For every k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , qT }, |S1,k−1−S1,k| ≤
2AdvDDH2G,B (1
λ).
Proof At the beginning, a PPT adversary B receives an




2 , T ) of the DDH2 problem. Then,




$← Zp and α






























z := e(g1, g2)
x0α−y0 , u1 := g
x′1





1 , v1 := g
x′4
1 .
B sends prms := (g1, gα1 , u1, w1, h1, v1, z) to A. B also
chooses βi, β
′
i,← Zp with i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 4}. Note that B
does not know a master helper key mhk but knows an
initial master key mk0.























y′′i for i ∈ {1, 3, 4}, gx22 := g
c2
2 .
Therefore, B can simulate the oracle Oext.
We show how B simulates the oracle Oleak for a
query T ∈ T (not ⋆). Let T(i) be an i-th time-period is-
sued to the oracle. B creates k−1 partial semi-functional
master keys, and embeds T into keys for the k-th pe-
riod. The rest of keys are normal.
Case i < k and Case i > k: After receiving T(i), B cre-
ates and returns semi-functional decryption keys.
Since B knows (gxi2 , g
yi
2 ) (i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 4}), B can
create both normal and partial semi-functional mas-
ter keys.
Case i = k: After receiving T(k), B creates a master key































































y,i}2i=1). If b = 0, then it is easy to see
that the above key is normal by setting s1 := c1. If
b = 1, then the above master key is partial semi-
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and ψ1 := y
′′




3 are chosen uniformly
at random, ϕ1 is uniformly distributed.
We next show how B simulate the Oleak oracle for
a query ⋆ . Note that in this case, A cannot issue any
other queries to the oracle Oleak. To create mhk, B
randomly chooses ζi, ζ
′
i
$← Zp with i ∈ {1, . . . , 4}, and
implicitly sets “new” noises βi and β
′
i as follows.
βi := ζi − xi, β′i := −ζ ′i − yi,
where 1 ≤ i ≤ 4. Then, B computes Bx,0 := gx0+β02
and By,0 := g
−y0−β′0
2 , and sets Bx,i := g
ζi
2 and By,i :=
g
ζ′i
2 with i ∈ {1, . . . , 4}. Although B does not know the
values of {βi, β′i}4i=1, the proof works well since A never
issues any queries to the oracle Oleak.
In the challenge phase, B receives (M∗0 ,M∗1 , T∗, I∗)
from A. B chooses d $← {0, 1}. However, B cannot cre-
ate the semi-functional ciphertext for I∗ for T∗ without
knowledge of c2 (and hence y1, y3, and y4). To generate




:= T∗y′′1 − y′′3 − I∗y′′4 .
Since y′′1 , y
′′
3 , and y
′′
4 are chosen uniformly at random,
probability distribution of t̃ag
∗
is also uniformly at ran-
dom from A’s view. Furthermore, t̃ag∗ is independent




if A computes a decryption key d̃kT(k),I for any I from





4 . Namely, A can get d̃kT(k),I for any I
(without re-randomization), where

































and ϕ1Iψ1 are independent of each other












and it holds (T∗, I∗) ̸= (T(k), I). Then, B chooses s $←
Zp and µ


















































































B sends c̃t∗T∗,I∗ := (C̃∗M , C̃∗x, C̃∗y , C̃∗, t̃ag
∗
) to A.
After receiving d′ from A, B sends b′ = 1 to the
challenger of the DDH2 problem if d′ = d. Otherwise,
B sends b′ = 0 to the challenger. ⊓⊔
Lemma 5 For every k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , qT }, |S2,k−1−S2,k| ≤
2AdvDDH2G,B (1
λ).
Proof (Sketch) We can prove this Theorem in a similar
way to Lemma 4, therefore we here give only a proof
sketch. As for the k-th query T(k) to the oracle Oleak,
B embeds T into D2, Dx,2, D′x,2, D′′x,2, Dy,2, D′y,2, D′′y,2 in a
way similar to the proof of Lemma 4. If b = 0 then
mkT(k) is partial semi-functional. Otherwise, mkT(k) is
semi-functional. ⊓⊔
Lemma 6 For every k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , qI}, |S3,k−1−S3,k| ≤
2AdvDDH2G,B (1
λ).
Proof (Sketch) We can prove this Theorem in a similar
way to Lemma 4, therefore we here give only a proof
sketch. As for the k-th query (T(ik), I(ik)) to the ora-
cle Oext, B embeds T in a way similar to the proof
of Lemma 4. Specifically, after receiving (T(ik), I(ik)), B
creates a decryption key for I(ik) for T(ik) by embedding
T as follows. B computes













































B sets dkT(ik),I(ik) := (K, Kx, K′x, Ky, K′y). If b = 0, then it
is easy to see that the above key is normal by setting
s := c1. If b = 1, then the above decryption key is





























































































































Since y′′1 , y
′′
3 , and y
′′
4 are chosen uniformly at random,
ϕ is uniformly distributed. ⊓⊔
Lemma 7 |S3,q − SFinal| ≤ 2AdvDDH1G,B (1λ).





1 , g2, T ) of the DDH1 problem. Then,
B randomly chooses y′0, x1, y′1, x2, y′2, x3, y′3, x4, y′4
$← Zp
and α
$← Z×p , and (implicitly) sets
x0 := c1, y0 := x0α+ y
′
0, y1 := x1α+ y
′
1,
y2 := x2α+ y
′
2, y3 := x3α+ y
′




z := e(g1, g2)
−y′0 , u1 := g
−y′1





1 , v1 := g
−y′4
1 .
B sends prms := (g1, gα1 , u1, w1, h1, v1, z) to A. Note
that B does not know a part of mhk (i.e, x0 and y0).
When receiving a query (T, I), B can simulate the
oracle Oext as follows. B chooses s, ϕ′
$← Zp and γ
$←
Z×p , and sets
ϕ :=
α(ϕ′ − x0 − s(x1T+ x3 + x4I))
γ
.




































Since ϕ′ is randomly chosen, ϕ is randomly distributed





Similarly, B can simulate the oracle Oleak for a
query T ∈ T as follows. B chooses s1, s2, ϕ′1, ϕ′2
$← Zp
and γ1, γ2
$← Z×p , and sets
ϕ1 :=


















































































Since ϕ′1 and ϕ
′
2 are randomly chosen, ϕ1 and ϕ2 are ran-
domly distributed from A’s view, respectively. B sends










B can also simulate the Oleak oracle for a query ⋆ as




$← Zp, and implicitly sets “new” noises β0 and β′0
as follows.
β0 := ζ0 − x0, β′0 := −ζ ′0 − y0.
Then, B computes Bx,i := gxi+βi2 and By,i := g
−yi−β′i
2
with 1 ≤ i ≤ 4, and sets Bx,0 := gζ02 and By,0 := g
ζ′0
2 .
Since A cannot issue any queries to the oracle Oleak if
A queries to the Oleak oracle, the simulation is correct
from A’s view.
In the challenge phase, B receives (M∗0 ,M∗1 , T∗, I∗)




d · e(g1, g2)−y
′
0te(T, g2),

























B sends c̃t∗T∗,I∗ := (C̃∗M , C̃∗x, C̃∗y , C̃∗, t̃ag
∗
) to A.
If b = 0, then the above ciphertext is semi-functional
one of M∗d by setting µ := c2. If b = 1, then the above
ciphertext is semi-functional one of a random element
of GT since it holds
C̃∗M =M
∗
d · e(g1, g2)−y
′
0t+x0µ+η
=M∗d · e(g1, g2)x0αt−y0t+x0µ+η
=M∗d · e(g1, g2)x0(αt+µ)−y0te(g1, g2)η
= R · e(g1, g2)x0(αt+µ)−y0t,
where R =M∗d e(g1, g2)
η.
After receiving d′ from A, B sends b′ = 1 to the
challenger of the DDH1 problem if d′ = d. Otherwise,
B sends b′ = 0 to the challenger. ⊓⊔
Proof of Theorem 3. From Lemmas 3–7, we have
AdvID-KI-CPAMIKE,A(1
λ)




6.3 Proof of Theorem 4
We transition between games as in the proof of Theo-
rem 3. Namely, we define the following games:
GameReal: This is the same as the ANO-KI-CPA game.
Game0: This is the same as GameReal except that the
challenge ciphertext is semi-functional.
Game1,k (1 ≤ k ≤ qT ): This is the same as Game1,k in
the proof of Theorem 3. The first k master keys
are partial semi-functional, and the rest of keys are
normal.
Game2,k (1 ≤ k ≤ qT ): This is the same as Game2,k in
the proof of Theorem 3. The first k master keys
are semi-functional, and the rest of keys are partial
semi-functional.
Game3,k (1 ≤ k ≤ qI): This is the same as Game2,k in
the proof of Theorem 3. The first k decryption keys
are semi-functional, and the rest of keys are partial
semi-functional.
GameFinal: This is the same as Game3,q except for the
following modification:A obtains a challenge cipher-







∗) such that C∗ is a
random element of G1. This means that the chal-
lenge ciphertext does not contain any information
of T∗ and I∗.
Let SReal, S1,k (0 ≤ k ≤ qT ), S2,k (0 ≤ k ≤ qT ),
S3,k (0 ≤ k ≤ qI), and SFinal be the probabilities that
the event b′ = b occurs in GameReal, Game1,k, Game2,k,














|S3,i−1 − S3,i|+ |S3,qI − SFinal|,
where S1,0 := S0, S2,0 := S1,qT , and S3,0 := S2,qT .
We can show all the transitions except for the last
one as in Lemmas 3 and 6. What we have to show is
the last transition.









1 , g2, T ) of the DDH1 problem. Then,
B randomly chooses x0, y′0, x1, y′1, x2, y′2, y′3, x4, y′4
$← Zp
and α
$← Z×p , and (implicitly) sets
y0 := x0α+ y
′
0, y1 := x1α+ y
′
1, y2 := x2α+ y
′
2,
x3 := c1, y3 := x3α+ y
′




z := e(g1, g2)
−y′0 , u1 := g
−y′1





1 , v1 := g
−y′4
1 .
B sends prms := (g1, gα1 , u1, w1, h1, v1, z) to A. Note
that B does not know a part of mhk (i.e, x3 and y3).
When receiving a query (T, I), B can simulate the
oracle Oext as follows. B chooses s, ϕ′
$← Zp and γ
$←




































Since ϕ′ is randomly chosen, ϕ is randomly distributed





For personal use only: DO NOT DISTRIBUTE! 21
Similarly, B can simulate the oracle Oleak for a
query T as follows. B chooses s1, s2, ϕ′1, ϕ′2
$← Zp and
γ1, γ2















































































Since ϕ′1 and ϕ
′
2 are randomly chosen, ϕ1 and ϕ2 are ran-
domly distributed from A’s view, respectively. B then










B can also simulate the oracle Oleak for a query ⋆ as




$← Zp, and implicitly sets “new” noises β3 and β′3
as follows.
β3 := ζ3 − x3, β′3 := −ζ ′3 − y3.
Then, B computes Bx,i := gxi+βi2 and By,i := g
−yi−β′i
2
with i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 4}, and sets Bx,3 := gζ32 and By,3 :=
g
ζ′3
2 . Since A cannot issue any other queries to the oracle
Oleak when A issues ⋆ to it, the simulation is correct
from A’s view.
In the challenge phase, B receives (M∗, I∗0, I∗1, T∗)
from A. B chooses d $← {0, 1}. B chooses t, tag∗ $← Zp
and computes
C̃∗M :=M






























∗, tag∗) to A.
If b = 0, then the above ciphertext is semi-functional
one of M∗d by setting µ := c2. If b = 1, then C̃
∗ is a
































is completely hidden from A’s view.
After receiving d′ from A, B sends b′ = 1 to the
challenger of the DDH1 problem if d′ = d. Otherwise,
B sends b′ = 0 to the challenger. ⊓⊔









In this paper, we first proposed key-updatable public-
key encryption with keyword search as one solution
against key leakage problem for IoT environments. Specif-
ically we proposed two model: the key-evolution model
and the key insulation model. In each model, we de-
fined the model and security notions, and showed the
generic construction. The former model is conceptually
simple. On the one hand, the latter model is preferable
for practical use since redistribution of public key is not
needed. We show implementation results on Raspberry
Pi of our proposals. Our instantiation in the key evolu-
tion model is fastest in the sense of running time. On
the other hand, the execution time of each core algo-
rithm of our instantiation in the key insulation model
(on Raspberry Pi) is less than 550 msec except for the
setup and key update algorithms. Hence, we conclude
that all the instantiations could be applicable for IoT
devices.
Acknowledgements We would like to thank the anony-
mous reviewers for useful comments. The first, second, and
third authors were supported by Grant-in-Aid for Scientific
Research (C) Grant Number JP17K00189. The last author
was supported by JSPS Research Fellowship for Young Scien-
tists, Grant-in-Aid for JSPS Fellows Grant Number JP16J10532,
and Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B) Grant Number
JP17K12697.
Compliance with Ethical Standards The author Hiroaki
Anada declares that he has no conflict of interest. The au-
thor Akira Kanaoka declares that he has no conflict of inter-
est. The author Natsume Matsuzaki declares that she has no
conflict of interest. The author Yohei Watanabe declares that
he has no conflict of interest.
22 For personal use only: DO NOT DISTRIBUTE!
Ethical approval: This article does not contain any studies
with human participants or animals performed by any of the
authors.
References
1. Abdalla, M., Bellare, M., Catalano, D., Kiltz, E., Kohno,
T., Lange, T., Malone-Lee, J., Neven, G., Paillier, P., Shi,
H.: Searchable encryption revisited: Consistency prop-
erties, relation to anonymous IBE, and extensions. In:
Shoup, V. (ed.) Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO
2005. vol. 3621, pp. 205–222. Springer (2005)
2. Abdalla, M., Bellare, M., Catalano, D., Kiltz, E., Kohno,
T., Lange, T., Malone-Lee, J., Neven, G., Paillier, P., Shi,
H.: Searchable encryption revisited: Consistency proper-
ties, relation to anonymous IBE, and extensions. J. Cryp-
tology 21(3), 350–391 (2008)
3. Anada, H., Kanaoka, A., Matsuzaki, N., Watanabe,
Y.: Key-updatable public-key encryption with keyword
search: Models and generic constructions. In: Susilo, W.,
Yang, G. (eds.) Information Security and Privacy. pp.
341–359. Springer International Publishing, Cham (2018)
4. Baek, J., Safavi-Naini, R., Susilo, W.: Public key encryp-
tion with keyword search revisited. In: ICCSA 2008, Part
I. pp. 1249–1259 (2008)
5. Blaze, M., Bleumer, G., Strauss, M.: Divertible protocols
and atomic proxy cryptography. In: Nyberg, K. (ed.) Ad-
vances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT’98. vol. 1403, pp.
127–144. Springer Berlin Heidelberg (1998)
6. Boldyreva, A., Goyal, V., Kumar, V.: Identity-based en-
cryption with efficient revocation. In: Proc. of CCS’08.
pp. 417–426. ACM, New York, NY, USA (2008)
7. Boneh, D., Crescenzo, G.D., Ostrovsky, R., Persiano, G.:
Public key encryption with keyword search. In: Advances
in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2004. pp. 506–522 (2004)
8. Boneh, D., Franklin, M.K.: Identity-based encryption
from the weil pairing. In: Advances in Cryptology –
CRYPTO’01. pp. 213–229. Springer-Verlag (2001)
9. Boneh, D., Kushilevitz, E., Ostrovsky, R., III, W.E.S.:
Public key encryption that allows PIR queries. In: Ad-
vances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2007. pp. 50–67 (2007)
10. Byun, J.W., Rhee, H.S., Park, H.A., Lee, D.H.: Off-
line keyword guessing attacks on recent keyword search
schemes over encrypted data. In: Jonker, W., Petković,
M. (eds.) Secure Data Management. pp. 75–83. Springer
Berlin Heidelberg (2006)
11. Canetti, R., Halevi, S., Katz, J.: A forward-secure public-
key encryption scheme. In: Biham, E. (ed.) Advances in
Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2003. LNCS, vol. 2656, pp.
255–271. Springer Berlin Heidelberg (2003)
12. Cheon, J.H., Hopper, N., Kim, Y., Osipkov, I.: Provably
secure timed-release public key encryption. ACM Trans.
Inf. Syst. Secur. 11(2), 4:1–4:44 (May 2008)
13. Chor, B., Goldreich, O., Kushilevitz, E., Sudan, M.: Pri-
vate information retrieval. In: FOCS’95. pp. 41–50 (1995)
14. Dodis, Y., Franklin, M., Katz, J., Miyaji, A., Yung, M.:
A generic construction for intrusion-resilient public-key
encryption. In: Okamoto, T. (ed.) Topics in Cryptology
– CT-RSA 2004. vol. 2964, pp. 81–98. Springer Berlin
Heidelberg (2004)
15. Dodis, Y., Katz, J., Xu, S., Yung, M.: Key-insulated pub-
lic key cryptosystems. In: Knudsen, L. (ed.) Advances in
Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2002. vol. 2332, pp. 65–82.
Springer Berlin Heidelberg (2002)
16. Dodis, Y., Katz, J., Xu, S., Yung, M.: Strong key-
insulated signature schemes. In: Desmedt, Y. (ed.) PKC
2003. vol. 2567, pp. 130–144. Springer (2003)
17. ElGamal, T.: A public key cryptosystem and a sig-
nature scheme based on discrete logarithms. In: Blak-
ley, G., Chaum, D. (eds.) Advances in Cryptology –
CRYPTO’84. vol. 196, pp. 10–18. Springer Berlin Hei-
delberg (1985)
18. Emura, K., Phong, L.T., Watanabe, Y.: Keyword re-
vocable searchable encryption with trapdoor exposure
resistance and re-generateability. In: 2015 IEEE Trust-
com/BigDataSE/ISPA. vol. 1, pp. 167–174 (Aug 2015)
19. Green, M., Ateniese, G.: Identity-based proxy re-
encryption. In: ACNS 2007. pp. 288–306 (2007)
20. Hanaoka, Y., Hanaoka, G., Shikata, J., Imai, H.: Identity-
based hierarchical strongly key-insulated encryption and
its application. In: Roy, B. (ed.) Advances in Cryptology
– ASIACRYPT 2005. vol. 3788, pp. 495–514. Springer
(2005)
21. Jutla, C.S., Roy, A.: Shorter quasi-adaptive NIZK proofs
for linear subspaces. In: Sako, K., Sarkar, P. (eds.) Ad-
vances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2013. LNCS, vol.
8269, pp. 1–20. Springer Berlin Heidelberg (2013)
22. Kocher, P.C.: Timing attacks on implementations of
Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and other systems. In: Ad-
vances in Cryptology - CRYPTO ’96. pp. 104–113 (1996)
23. Lewko, A.B.: Tools for simulating features of compos-
ite order bilinear groups in the prime order setting. In:
Pointcheval, D., Johansson, T. (eds.) Advances in Cryp-
tology – EUROCRYPT 2012. vol. 7237, pp. 318–335.
Springer (2012)
24. Libert, B., Vergnaud, D.: Adaptive-id secure revocable
identity-based encryption. In: Fischlin, M. (ed.) Topics in
Cryptology – CT-RSA 2009. vol. 5473, pp. 1–15. Springer
Berlin Heidelberg (2009)
25. Naor, D., Naor, M., Lotspiech, J.: Revocation and trac-
ing schemes for stateless receivers. In: Kilian, J. (ed.)
Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2001. vol. 2139, pp.
41–62. Springer Berlin Heidelberg (2001)
26. National Institute of Standards and Technology: Nist
special publication 800-57 part 1, revision 4, recommen-
dation for key management part 1: General (2013),
27. Seo, J.H., Emura, K.: Revocable identity-based encryp-
tion revisited: Security model and construction. In: Kuro-
sawa, K., Hanaoka, G. (eds.) PKC 2013. vol. 7778, pp.
216–234. Springer Berlin Heidelberg (2013)
28. Shikata, J., Watanabe, Y.: Identity-based encryption
with hierarchical key-insulation in the standard model.
Designs, Codes and Cryptography (Jun 2018), to appear.
First online: 8th June 2018.
29. Tang, Q.: Towards forward security properties for peks
and ibe. In: Foo, E., Stebila, D. (eds.) ACISP 2015. vol.
9144, pp. 127–144. Springer (2015)
30. Watanabe, Y., Shikata, J.: Identity-based hierarchical
key-insulated encryption without random oracles. In:
Cheng, C.M., Chung, K.M., Persiano, G., Yang, B.Y.
(eds.) PKC 2016, Part I. LNCS, vol. 9614, pp. 255–279.
Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg (2016)
31. Waters, B.: Dual system encryption: Realizing fully se-
cure IBE and HIBE under simple assumptions. In: Halevi,
S. (ed.) Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2009. vol.
5677, pp. 619–636. Springer Berlin Heidelberg (2009)
For personal use only: DO NOT DISTRIBUTE! 23
A Proof of Lemma 1
We construct a PPT adversary B which breaks the IND-CPA
security of PKE using a PPT adversary A which wins G2 or
G3.
Setup. B guesses i∗ such that i∗ is a time period when
computing the challenge ciphertext, and the guess is cor-
rect since Fail does not occur. Without loss of generality, we
here assume i∗ ̸= 1. When receiving (parpke, ek∗), B com-
putes (ek1, dk1) ← G(parpke), parpeks ← Setuppeks(1λ), and
(mpk1,msk1) ← KeyGenpeks(parpeks), and chooses H
$← H, A
then sends pk1 := (parpke, parpeks,H, ek1,mpk1) to A. B stores
sk1 := (dk1,msk1).
Oracle simulation. B simulates each oracle as follows.
Okg: If ctr ∈ {1, . . . , i∗− 2}, B computes (ekctr+1, dkctr+1)←
G(parpke) and (mpkctr+1,mskctr+1)← KeyGenpeks(parpeks),
and returns pkctr+1 := (parpke, parpeks,H, ekctr+1,mpkctr+1)
and rkctr→ctr+1 := dkctr to A. It stores skctr+1 := (dkctr+1,
mskctr+1), and sets ctr := ctr + 1. If ctr = i∗ − 1, B com-
putes (mpki∗ ,mski∗) ← KeyGenpeks(parpeks), and returns
pki∗ := (parpke, parpeks,H, ek
∗,mpki∗) and rki∗−1→i∗ :=
dki∗−1 to A. B stores only mski∗ , and sets ctr := i∗. Note
that B does not know dki∗ .
Okl: For a query j ∈ {1, . . . , ctr − 1}, B returns skj .
Otd: For (w, j) ∈ W×{1, . . . , ctr}, B returns Trapdoorpeks(mskj ,
H(w)).
Challenge. B receives (w∗0 , w∗1 ) fromA and randomly chooses
β ← {0, 1}. B chooses a zero-bit string 0log |Y| whose length
is the same as the output of H (we assume 0log |Y| can be ef-
ficiently encoded into an element of Y). B sends (ŵ∗0 , ŵ∗1 ) :=
(H(w∗β), 0
log |Y|) to the challenger of PKE as challenge plain-
texts. The challenger chooses b
$← {0, 1}, and returns ctctr ←







,ctr := (ctctr, ctw∗β,ctr) to A.
Output. If A’s output β′ satisfies β′ = β, B outputs b′ = 0.
Otherwise, B outputs b′ = 1.




,i∗ is the challenge ciphertext in G2 where










∣∣∣∣Pr[ExpCPAPKE,B(1λ) = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣Pr[b′ = b]− 12
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣Pr[b′ = 0 ∧ b = 0] + Pr[b′ = 1 ∧ b = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣12 Pr[b′ = 0 | b = 0] + 12 Pr[b′ = 1 | b = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣
=













|Pr[S2 | ¬Fail]− Pr[S3 | ¬Fail]| .
Hence, we have
|Pr[S2 | ¬Fail]− Pr[S3 | ¬Fail]| = 2AdvCPAPKE,B(1λ). ⊓⊔
B Proof of Lemma 2
We construct a PPT adversary B which breaks the IND-CKA
security of PEKS using a PPT adversary A which wins G3
when Fail does not occur.
Setup. This procedure is almost the same as that in the
proof of Lemma 1. B guesses i∗ such that i∗ is a time pe-
riod when generating the challenge ciphertext, and the guess
is correct since Fail does not occur. Without loss of general-
ity, we here assume i∗ ̸= 1. When receiving (parpeks,mpk∗), B
runs parpke ← PG(1λ), (ek1, dk1)← G(parpke), and (mpk1,msk1)←
KeyGenpeks(parpeks), and chooses H
$← H. B sends pk1 :=
(parpke, parpeks,H, ek1,mpk1) toA, and stores sk1 := (dk1,msk1).
Oracle simulation B simulates each oracle as follows.
Okg: If ctr ∈ {1, . . . , i∗− 2}, B computes (ekctr+1, dkctr+1)←
G(parpke) and (mpkctr+1,mskctr+1)← KeyGenpeks(parpeks),
and returns pkctr+1 := (parpke, parpeks,H, ekctr+1,mpkctr+1)
and rkctr→ctr+1 := dkctr to A. It stores skctr+1 := (dkctr+1,
mskctr+1), and sets ctr := ctr + 1. If ctr = i∗ − 1, B
computes (eki∗ , dki∗) ← G(parpke), and returns pki∗ :=
(parpke, parpeks,H, eki∗ ,mpk
∗) and rki∗−1→i∗ := dki∗−1
to A. B stores only dki∗ , and sets ctr := i∗. Note that B
does not know mski∗ .
Okl: For a query j ∈ {1, . . . , ctr − 1}, B returns skj .
Otd: If ctr ̸= i∗, for a query (w, j) ∈ W × {1, . . . , ctr}, B re-
turns Trapdoorpeks(mskj ,H(w)). If ctr = i
∗, B simulates
the oracle as follows. For a query (w, j) ∈ W×{1, . . . , ctr},
if j ̸= i∗, B returns Trapdoorpeks(mskj ,H(w)). Otherwise,
B sends w toOtd of PEKS to get t∗w ← Trapdoorpeks(msk∗,
H(w)), and transfers it to A.
Challenge. When receiving (w∗0 , w
∗
1 ) fromA, B sends (H(w∗0 ),
H(w∗1 )) to the challenger of PEKS. The challenger randomly
chooses b
$← {0, 1}, and returns ctw∗
b
,ctr ← Encpeks(mpk∗,





,ctr := (ctctr, ctw∗β,ctr) to A.
Output B outputs b′, the output of A as is.
The success probability of B for the IND-CKA game is the
same as that of A for G3. Therefore, we have∣∣∣∣Pr[S3 | ¬Fail]− 12
∣∣∣∣ = AdvCKAPEKS,B(1λ). ⊓⊔
C DBDH Assumption
The decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) assumption is
defined as follows. Let A be a PPT adversary, and we consider
the following game against A.
ExpDBDHG,A (1
λ) 
D := (p,G1,G2,GT , g1, g2, e)← G(1λ)
c1, c2, c3, µ
$← Zp, b
$← {0, 1}
if b = 0 then T := e(g1, g2)
c1c2c3
else T := e(g1, g2)
µ










2 , T )
if b′ = b return 1 else return 0 
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Definition 14 (DBDH assumption) We say that the DBDH
assumption relative to a generator G holds if for all PPT ad-
versaries A, AdvDBDHG,A (1λ) := |Pr[ExpDBDHG,A (1λ) = 1]− 1/2| is
negligible in λ.
